“Of course courts decide on a case-by-case basis what does and does not constitute abuse, but I’ve yet to see or hear of a decision stating that “in this jurisdiction a parent’s decision to do X, Y, and Z does not constitute abuse.””

You asked do prosecutors and judges ever tell you what is NOT abuse. The answer is all the time. Prosecutors when they don’t charge cases, and judges when they rule on summary judgment. Courts when juries render verdicts of not guilty in criminal cases or don’t find negligence in civil. In each of those cases the conduct has not risen to the level of criminal or civil liability, thus you know those acts don’t constitute abuse. It happens every day. Again, that you don’t know about it doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen.

“So what the court was implicitly ruling is that any time a physician in New Jersey contacts the Poison Center regarding a child, that physician better also be filing a report with the state, lest … in the event of a bad outcome … the physician be held liable for medical malpractice for failing to report.”

This is incorrect. The explicit, and only, ruling, was that the court said that as a matter of law this is a factual dispute which is appropriate for the jury to decide. Your “bad outcome” language is a red herring, and irrelevant to this particular ruling, although not the case. The jury may well decide that there was no duty of the physician to report. That’s what juries do – decide questions of fact. Again, that you don’t know this doesn’t mean it’s not true.

“, the justices believed that because the record failed to explain who was supervising the child at every second of every day and failed to explain how a 2-year-old child was able to access and consume cologne, a finding of reckless conduct could be reasonably inferred.”

The reason you believe this is because you don’t understand the standard for summary judgment. There is a bias in the law for the jury to hear the case – what with us fighting the Revolutionary War to preserve the right and enshrining it in the Constitution. Thus when a court reviews a motion for summary judgment it does so by assuming all facts in favor of the non-moving party and resolving all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Therefore when an appellate court analyzes the case, it analyzes it based on that standard as well. If the case goes back down, the jury finds in favor of the physician, and it’s appealed again, the appellate court will give deference to the finding of the jury.

You are right – jury decisions themselves are not binding precedent. When they are appealed they are. This decision is a very limited one related to an appeal of a summary judgment decisions. It is not at all uncommon for trial court summary judgment decisions to be overturned. All that means is that there is a question of fact for the jury to decide.

I realize it’s all pretty boring Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure stuff, and I wouldn’t expect you to know it, or anyone who doesn’t practice law. Not because they’re dumb, but because most people have never even cracked open the Rules of Civil Procedure. However, you would think you might know what you don’t know and not be so cavalier in criticizing those who do understand what they’re talking about. But then, humility isn’t really your way, is it? Must be your curse, being an expert on everything.

Welcome back. Good to see that your waning legal acumen is still going strong.

Of course courts decide on a case-by-case basis what does and does not constitute abuse, but I’ve yet to see or hear of a decision stating that “in this jurisdiction a parent’s decision to do X, Y, and Z does not constitute abuse.” You aware of any such cases, counselor? Perhaps you could go log onto WestLaw and provide us all with some citations.

When you’re finished, why don’t you re-read my commentary to the decision. You’ll see that I said “ingestion of any potential poison creates a question as to whether there was abuse.” So what the court was implicitly ruling is that any time a physician in New Jersey contacts the Poison Center regarding a child, that physician better also be filing a report with the state, lest … in the event of a bad outcome … the physician be held liable for medical malpractice for failing to report. That reasoning should probably extend to all childhood injuries as well. Who is a doctor to say whether the parents were lying about how a child cut their finger?

And if you read down to the end of the linked opinion, the justices believed that because the record failed to explain who was supervising the child at every second of every day and failed to explain how a 2-year-old child was able to access and consume cologne, a finding of reckless conduct could be reasonably inferred.

Fear the bad outcome.

Nowhere did I say that “the alcohol content triggered reporting requirements”.

Finally, unlike the poorly reasoned appellate opinion, jury decisions about whether failure to keep track of kids every moment of the day and failure to explain how a kid got ahold of a bottle of cologne constitute recklessness (not “negligence” as you suggest) are not binding legal precedent. Hopefully the NJ Supreme Court sees how silly this opinion was and reverses it.

Hoping the new year affords you some better legal analysis skills,

Cordially,
WC

They do, you just don’t read those cases. Courts routinely declare acts do not constitute negligence or rise to the level of criminal sanction. That you don’t know about it doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen. May be a byproduct of your sources for legal news. By the way, you misread the case. The court did not conclude that the alcohol content triggered reporting requirements. The court said that a jury should decide that is all. If the jury finds it was not negligent, then you will have your question answered.